Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Twodimensional semantics: Twodimensional are semantics that take into account both the properties of a situation described by a statement and the properties of the utterance situation (which need not be identical with the described situation). For example, the statement that one is at location A, B or C is true when it is uttered at location A, B or C (diagonalization). Statements of a particular form are always true, e.g. "I am here now". In this case, the entire two-dimensional matrix is assigned the value "true". Two-dimensional semantics go back to D. Kaplan (D. Kaplan, Demonstratives, in Perry & Wettstein (Eds.) Themes from Kaplan, Oxford, 1989, pp. 481-563). See also context/context dependency, diagonalization, diagonal propositions, A-intensions, C-intensions, Stalnaker intensions, character, content._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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David K. Lewis on Twodimensional Semantics - Dictionary of Arguments
V 16 Double indexing/double index/possible worlds/counterfactual conditional/Lewis: Counterfactual conditionals are contingent in general. So we need double indexing - i.e. that certain phrases are not absolutely true/false. But in relation to a world j - Let F be a special sentence which is true in j relative to i iff j f (A, i) (similar world) . - then F A > C is true in j relative to i, if j belongs to f (A, i), C is true in j ( If..., if...). >Possible world/Lewis, >Counterfactual conditional/Lewis. Def operator $/spelling: dollar for death Cross/Lewis: $ B is true in i relative to j iff B is true in i relative to i itself. Def counterfactual conditional/Lewis: - A >> C = def $ N (F A > C) - so that we have a choice function brought into the object language. >Selection function/Lewis._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |